or maybe Alexander’s Dictum?
And birthday gift
To ask a question, click participants and then “raise hand” at the bottom
Uriah. Can you unshare his screen?
I would understand reductionists who *don’t* endorse priority monism to take non-fundamental properties to in some sense be Boolean combinations of fundamental properties – e.g., disjunctive properties. Does anyone know what priority monists who are reductionists say? Do they go the other way around – e.g., the fundamental properties are disjunctive properties, the less fundamental ones the disjuncts?
Nice talk! And I don’t want to take up time. But someone has to defend the (to be sure, highly suspect) Phenomenal Concept Strategy! So here goes: If you’re willing to be reductionist about phenomenal properties, but hold that subjects are somehow special, why not skip all the panpsychism and just say that subjects are physical systems sufficiently complex to form phenomenal concepts—and thus are the only physical systems able to know what it’s like to have phenomenal properties. And then you could explain why there is an explanatory gap, why we can’t know what it’s like to be a bat, etc.
nice talk Philip, gotta go. bye all.